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Corbett: Public Lands - Oil and Gas Leasing in Proposed Wilderness Areas -

PUBLIC LANDS - Oil and Gas Leasing in Proposed Wilderness Areas - The
Wyoming District Court's Interpretation of Section 603 of the Federal
Land Policy Management Act of 1976 - Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas
Association v. Andrus, 500 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Wyo. 1980), appeal
docketed, No. 81-1040 (10th Cir. Jan. 5, 1981).
INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association
(RMOGA), a non-profit trade association, brought suit
against the Secretary of the Interior, challenging land
management policies of the Department of the Interior
which plaintiff contended have effectively prohibited oil and
gas exploration in areas proposed as wilderness1 under the
Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA).2
The principal issue at trial was Interior's interpretation of
the wilderness study provisions contained in Section 603 of
the Act,' which directed that activities on oil and gas leases in
proposed wilderness areas be managed so as to prevent impairment of wilderness values.
The United States Court for the District of Wyoming,
Kerr, J., held that strict application of the non-impairment
standard of Section 603, FLPMA, by the Department of the
Interior virtually halted oil and gas exploration in proposed
wilderness areas, and is therefore statutorily erroneous,
clearly contrary to Congressional intent, and counter-productive to public interest.' The Trial Court's decision is
presently being appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals under the title Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association v. Watt.
HISTORY

The Federal Land Policy Management Act, signed into
law on October 21, 1976, was intended to provide the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM), with the first comprehensive statutory statement of purposes, goals and authority for the
use and management of about 448 million acres of federally
Copyright@ 1982 by the University of Wyoming

1.

Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association v. Andrus, 500 F. Supp. 1338
(D. Wyo. 1980) [hereinafter cited as RMOGA v. Andrus].
2. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976).
3. Federal Land Policy and Management Act § 603, 43 U.S.C. § 1782 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as FLPMA].
4. RMOGA v. Andrus, supra note 1, at 1344, 1346..
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owned public lands." For the first time, Congress stated its
intent that the public lands should be retained in federal
ownership, unless disposal of particular lands was in the
federal interest,6 in contrast to more than a century of social
policy which mandated the transfer of public lands into
private ownership.
Because FLPMA was intended to strike a balance between such competing interests as mineral development,
timber, grazing, and the preservation of wilderness, the
language of the Act is, to some extent, inconsistent, and
therefore requires close interpretation. For example, the
policy directives of the Act declare that the public lands
shall be managed in a manner that will "preserve and protect certain public lands in their natural condition"' and
yet, at the same time, recognize "the Nation's need for
domestic sources of minerals, food, timber, and fiber."8
Consistent with Congressional intent to balance competing interests in the public lands, FLPMA requires the
Secretary to conduct an inventory of all the public lands
and their resource values.' The Secretary is further directed
to examine all roadless areas of 5000 or more acres identified during the inventory process as having wilderness
characteristics, and within 15 years from the effective date
of FLPMA, to recommend to the President which of these
roadless islands should be preserved as wilderness" according to the provisions of the Wilderness Act of 1964.11
Section 603 of FLPMA, requiring the review of all
areas with wilderness characteristics and directing the interim management of proposed wilderness areas by BLM,
is the most controversial of the Act's provisions, and is the
section which presents the most troublesome interpretive
difficulties. Section 603 states, in pertinent part:
During the period of review ...the Secretary shall
continue to manage such lands ...so as not to im5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

S. REP. No. 583, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1976).
43 U.S.C. § 1701 (a) (1) (1976).
Id. § 1701(a) (8).
Id. § 1701(a) (12).
Id. § 1711(a).
Id. § 1782.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1136 (4976).
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pair the suitability of such areas for preservation
of wilderness, subject, however, to the continuation
of existing mining and grazing uses and mineral
leasing in the same manner and degree in which
the same was being conducted [on the date of approval of this Act]: Provided, that, in managing
the public lands, the Secretary shall by regulation
or otherwise take any action required to prevent
unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands and
their resources or to afford environmental protection.1"
In an attempt to resolve the meaning of this provision,
the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior under the
Carter administration, Leo Krulitz, issued a legal opinion
in September of 1978 interpreting Section 603 of FLPMA."
Under this interpretation, Section 603 mandates two standards for the management of proposed wilderness areas.
One standard applies to uses of the lands that were existing
prior to October 21, 1976; they are to be regulated only to
the extent necessary to prevent undue degradation of the
environment. Uses coming into existence after that date,
however, are subject to a far stricter standard; they must
be regulated to the extent necessary to prevent the impairment of wilderness characteristics.14 It is important to note
that according to this interpretation of the statute, mineral
leases issued before the passage of FLPMA are not automatically managed under the less strict "undue degradation" standard. There must be some actual activity on those
leases prior to the passage of the Act for that standard to
apply. Moreover, BLM would permit this activity to continue only in the same "manner and degree" that it was
being conducted before passage of the Act. 5
Finally, emphasizing the interim nature of regulation
under Section 603, the opinion cites the 1970 case of Parker
v. United States 6 to justify the position that lands under
12. 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1976).
13. Memorandum from Solicitor to Secretary of Interior, BLM Wilderness
Review-Section 603, Federal Land Policy and Management Act (Sept.
5, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Solicitor's Opinion].
14. Id. at 14.
15. Id. at 18.
16. 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972).
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review for inclusion into the Wilderness Preservation System must be managed more restrictively than lands already
part of that system, which will not be withdrawn from
mineral entry until 1984."7
These two management standards-non-impairment of
proposed wilderness areas and prevention of undue degradation of the environment-became the policy of the Department of Interior as it proceeded with its inventory of the
public lands. Mineral leases on proposed wilderness areas
issued before the passage of FLPMA were subject to regulations prohibiting impairment of wilderness values, unless the leases were being actively worked and had created
physical impacts on the ground as of October 21, 1976, in
which case the leases were "grandfathered" by Section 603
and development was allowed to continue in the same manner and degree, subject only to regulations prohibiting unnecessary or undue degradation. BLM continued to issue
oil and gas leases after the passage of FLPMA, but it was
the Department's position that there are no "grandfathered"
uses inherent in post-FLPMA leases, 8 so activity on all
leases issued after October 21, 1976, was subject to the
non-impairment standard.
As defined by BLM, a proposed activity would satisfy
the non-impairment standard if it met three "non-impairment criteria." First, the use must be temporary; second,
any temporary impacts must be capable of being reclaimed
by the time the Secretary sends his recommendations to
Congress; and third, after reclamation the area's wilderness values must not be degraded so far as to "significantly
constrain" the Secretary's recommendation as to its suitability for preservation as wilderness.1"
Obviously, Departmental enforcement of these regulations significantly inhibited oil and gas development in proposed wilderness areas on both post-FLPMA leases and
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) (3) (1976).
18. BLM Interim Management Policy and Guidelines for Land Under Wilderness Review, 44 Fed. Reg. 72,013, 72,029 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BLM
Interim Management Policy].
19. Id. at 72,022.
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even on some pre-FLPMA leases. RMOGA, contending that
its members had suffered irreparable financial harm because
of these regulatory constraints, challenged the Solicitor's
Opinion and ensuing BLM regulations as contrary to law,
arbitrary, capricious, and completely erroneous. This challenge was upheld by the United States Court for the District
of Wyoming, which held that Interior's interpretation of
Section 603 was statutorily erroneous, clearly contrary to
Congressional intent, and counterproductive to public interest."
DISCUSSION

A. Background
The term "wilderness," as used in Section 603 of
FLPMA, is defined as having the same meaning as it does
in the Wilderness Act.2 1 There, with an eloquence rarely
found in statutory language, Congress defined the term in
this way:
A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where
man and his own works dominate the landscape, is
hereby recognized as an area where the earth and
its community of life are untrammeled by man,
where man himself is a visitor who does not
remain. An area of wilderness is further defined
to mean in this chapter an area of undeveloped
Federal land retaining its primeval character and
influence, without permanent improvements or
human habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural conditions and
which (1) generally appears to have been affected
primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially unnoticeable;
(2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or
a primitive and unconfined type of recreation .... 11
It can be seen from this definition that some use of wilderness areas is possible; man's work need only be "substantially unnoticeable". The mining claim of a hardrock miner,
20. RMOGA v. Andrus, supra note 1, at 1344, 1346.
21. FLPMA § 603, 43 U.S.C. § 1702(i) (1976).
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1976).
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using pick, shovel and burro, for example, would be substantially unnoticeable. The effects of portable seismic
exploration, using helicopters and proper environmental
safeguards would be unnoticeable after the work is completed. Even the site of one exploratory well, serviced by
an improved road, could be substantially unnoticeable once
the well is completed, provided that the drill pad, mud pits,
road and so on are reclaimed. However, full field oil and
gas development, with its many wells, roads, pipelines,
pumping equipment and personnel would obviously be
noticeable, even in a huge tract of wilderness. Furthermore,
man's presence on such a scale would, by definition, destroy
the wilderness characteristics of an area; man would remain, perhaps not forever, but for many years. It seems
obvious, then, that large scale oil and gas development and
wilderness are incompatible. 3
At this point in the nation's history it is well recognized that development of domestic energy and mineral
resources is of vital importance. But it is also recognized
by a substantial segment of the population (and by Congress in FLPMA and the Wilderness Act) that it is also
vital that we preserve for future generations a few small
portions of the wild areas left in this country. To some
extent, the frontier defined the character of the nation,
and many feel that it is essential that we draw lines around
some parts of the remaining frontier and preserve enough
wilderness so that future Americans will have the opportunity to face that frontier as their ancestors did. These,
then, are the interests and conflicts that Congress has
struggled with in both FLPMA and the Wilderness Act:
the nation's mineral resources must be developed, and yet
its wilderness resources must be preserved. In view of the
importance of these issues, some of which are raised
directly by this lawsuit, there seems to be a serious question whether the Wyoming District Court has adequately
dealt with them.
23. See, e.g., Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair, 353 F. Supp. 698 (D. Minn.
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 497- F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1009 (1974).
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B. Previous Cases in Point
The controversy in RMOGA v. Andrus centered on the
issue of whether mineral development on lands being reviewed for wilderness designation can be restricted to a
greater extent than on lands already designated wilderness.
In making its decision, the Wyoming court could have
looked for guidance to three cases which bear on this issue.
Two of these cases support the position of the Solicitor's
Opinion, the third case rejects such a policy. The Wyoming
court chose to rely upon only the third case.
The leading case, and the only case to directly interpret Section 603 of FLPMA, is Utah v. Andrus,24 which the
Wyoming court dismissed rather summarily as distinguishable on its facts. Utah v. Andrus concerned the efforts of a
mining company to build a road across public lands proposed as a wilderness area in order to gain access to its
mining claims on state land. The Utah court resolved some
of the troublesome inconsistencies in FLPMA by viewing
the Act in a "dynamic rather than a static context,"25 as
applying to all public lands, rather than individual parcels:
If one's view is expanded to the complex entirety
of land management decisions, then the statute is
not necessarily internally inconsistent. Some lands
can be preserved, while others, more appropriately,
can be mined. BLM is not obliged to, and indeed
cannot, reflect all the purposes of FLPMA in each
management action. 6
The court used this analysis to find that BLM could prohibit activity that would permanently impair wilderness
characteristics in order to prevent foreclosure of Congressional consideration of an area's potential for wilderness
designation.
The Utah court considered in detail the Solicitor's
interpretation of Section 603, and found ample support for
that interpretation in both the legislative history and the
statutory construction of FLPMA, a result contrary to that
24. 486 F. Supp. 995 (D. Utah 1979).
25. Id. at 1003.

26.

Ld.
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of the court in RMOGA v. Andrus. Thus, the Utah court
held that BLM has the authority to manage the public
lands so as to prevent impairment of wilderness values,
subject to actual uses existing on October 21, 1976, which
must be managed only to prevent unnecessary and undue
degradation. Finally, the court held that FLPMA does not
mandate that BLM allow all potential uses on a particular
parcel of land with no regard for wilderness characteristics." Because Utah v. Andrus directly addresses the interpretation of Section 603 of FLPMA, the section at issue in
RMOGA v. Andrus, it would seem that the case merits
more consideration than it was given by the Wyoming
court.
In Parker v. United States,2 which was cited with
approval by the Utah court, the Tenth Circuit of Appeals
upheld an injunction prohibiting timber harvesting in an
area adjoining a wilderness area until Congress made a
determination as to whether the area should be declared
wilderness. The court refused to concede to the Secretaries
of Interior and Agriculture the discretionary authority to
destroy the wilderness value of the area, holding that to
do so would render meaningless the clear intent of Congress
expressed in the Wilderness Act that both Congress and the
President shall make wilderness determinations.29
Like Utah v. Andrus, Parker v. United States was
also distinguished on its facts by the Wyoming court. Because the court in Parker was construing the Wilderness
Act and not FLPMA, and because the facts concerned timber harvesting rather than mineral entry, it can be argued
that the case is inapposite. Nevertheless, Parker v. United
States certainly stands for the proposition that an agency's
obligation to protect lands during the review process must
be viewed separately from its obligation to manage lands
already part of the Wilderness System, and therefore lands
in the review process may be managed more restrictively
27. Id. at 1007.
28. Parker v. United States, supra note 16.
29. Id. at 795.
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than lands already designated wilderness, a position rejected
by the RMOGA court.
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Andrus," decided a month before RMOGA by the same court, bears on
the issue of oil and gas leasing in proposed wilderness areas,
and can be viewed as part of the same effort by developmental interests to open these areas for exploration that
inspired RMOGA v. Andrus. There, the court held, contrary
to Utah v. Andrus, that it was the intent of Congress to
limit the ability of the Secretary of the Interior to remove
large tracts of the public lands from mineral entry. On
motion for summary judgment by the plaintiff, the court
held that inaction by the Departments of Interior and Agriculture with respect to oil and gas lease applications amounted to a "withdrawal", which without the approval of Congress, was in violation of FLPMA. The court also decided
that to manage lands in the review process more restrictively
than lands already declared wilderness would be inconsistent
with the intent of Congress," and was cited with approval
on this point by the RMOGA court.2
C. The Wyoming District Court's Interpretation of
Section 603.
At the heart of the controversy in RMOGA v. Andrus
is the issue of the previous administration's interpretation
of Section 603 of FLPMA, and in particular, the clause
which reads:
subject, however, to the continuation of existing
mining and grazing uses and mineral leasing in the
manner and degree in which the same was being
conducted [on the date of approval of this Act].
83

The Solicitor's Opinion construed this phrase to be a "grandfather" clause, limiting the application of the non-impairment standard to uses coming into existence after the pas30.
31.
32.
33.

499 F. Supp. 383 (D. Wyo. 1980).
Id. at 393.
RMOGA v. Andrus, 8upra note 1, at 1346.
FLPMA § 603, 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1976).
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sage of FLPMA 4 In other words, proposed wilderness
areas are to be managed so as not to impair their suitability
for inclusion into the Wilderness Preservation System. However, if actual mining and grazing uses, including oil and
gas leases, existed on the land on or prior to October 21,
1976, these uses are "grandfathered" and thus subject only
to the less restrictive standard of prevention of unnecessary
or undue degradation of the environment. This interpretation was upheld by the court in Utah v. Andrus." The Wyoming court, on the other hand, held that Section 603 is
clear and unequivocal on its face, that this clause requires
that oil and gas leasing and development on proposed wilderness areas be conducted as they had been prior to the passage of FLPMA, and that, therefore, the Solicitor's Opinion
was ''clearly erroneous."'8
Because of the juxtaposition of the noun "uses" with
the verb "leasing," this clause obviously presents interpretive difficulties. The Wyoming court notes that because the
verb "leasing" equates with action, Congress must have
intended that mineral leasing continue after October 21,
1976, in the same manner as before that date, and therefore
that such leases should not be subject to the non-impairment
clause." However, there are serious problems with this construction of the statutory language; such an interpretation
ignores the word "existing". In Section 603, "existing" can
be read to qualify both "mining and grazing use" and "mineral leasing". "Existing mineral leasing" must refer to
activities taking place under existing leases: it is difficult
to construe the phrase to mean leases issued in the future
(after October 21, 1976) as well.
The Wyoming court states that the term "manner and
degree" lends credence to its construction of the meaning of
the clause. 8 However, as discussed by the court in Utah v.
Andrus," when the statute refers to existing mining and
34.
35.
36.
37.

Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 13, at 13.
Utah v. Andrus, supra note 24, at 1005.
RMOGA v. Andrus, supra note 1, at 1344.
Id.

38. Id.

39. Utah v. Andrus, supra note 24, at 1006.
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grazing uses being carried out in the same manner and degree, it must refer to actual uses and activities, not merely
a statutory right to use. Unless the same construction is
given to the term "mineral leasing", the anomalous result
is that oil and gas leasing is given preferential treatment
over mining and grazing uses. The Wyoming court's interpretation produces just this result; mining and grazing uses
can be regulated so as to prevent impairment of wilderness
values, but mineral leasing, and exploration activities on
those leases may only be regulated so as to prevent undue
degradation of the environment. Such a result seems extremely unlikely; there is no language in FLPMA expressing Congressional intent to confer broader immunity to oil
and gas leasing than to mining. In fact, several sections of
the Act point to a contrary result.
Section 603 of FLPMA contains the proviso that "unless
previously withdrawn from appropriation under the mining
laws, such lands shall continue to be subject to such appropriation during the period of review unless withdrawn by
the Secretary . . . for reasons other than preservation of
their wilderness character."" This provision should be compared to Section 302(b), which provides, in part, "Except
as provided in... section 1782 (Section 603) ...no section
of this Act shall in any way amend the Mining Law of 1872
or impair the rights of any locators of claims under that
Act.... . 4 These two provisions demonstrate several things;
first, the "except as provided" clause indicates that Section
603 does amend the Mining Law of 1872, and second, Congress has shown great solicitude for that mining act.
Section 701 (f) of FLPMA provides that ". . . nothing
in this Act shall repeal any existing law.. ., and yet the
effect of the Wyoming court's interpretation would be to
repeal the Secretary's traditional discretion to lease minerals, given him by statute" and affirmed by case law."
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

FLPMA § 603, 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1976).
Id. § 302(b), 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (emphasis added).
Id. § 701 (f), 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (f).
Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 187, 189 (1976).
See, e.g. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965); McTiernan v. Franklin,
508 F.2d 885, 887 (10th Cir. 1975).
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Furthermore, a literal interpretation of the Wyoming court's
decision is that Secretarial discretion is abolished only in
wilderness study areas. Mining claims are in the nature of
property interests; the Mining Law of 1872 gives broad
rights to miners.4" Grazing permits and mineral leases, on
the other hand, are contractual privileges, and issuance is
discretionary with the Secretary.4" It seems extraordinary
to hold, as did the Wyoming court, that Congress intended
that FLPMA would give broader immunity from regulation
to oil and gas leases than to mining and grazing uses. Although a literal reading of the statute might possibly lead
to the interpretation that mineral leasing should continue
in the same manner and degree as before the passage of
FLPMA, surely such a result was not the intent of
Congress."7
If a statute is ambiguous on its face, as Section 603
appears to be, interpreters of that statute should look to
legislative history to properly construe the meaning of the
law. After noting that the legislative history of FLPMA
can be selectively read to support the viewpoint of plaintiff
or defendant, the Wyoming court held that because the statute is clear on its face, resort to legislative history is unnecessary. 8 Thus the court has nicely avoided the problems
of interpreting Section 603 by holding it to be clear on its
face, and then the court has relied on that holding to cut
off critical enquiry into the legislative history of the Act
which suggests that the statute is not clear. For example,
the only occasion where the court resorts to legislative history is to condemn the Solicitor's reliance on Parker v.
United States. The court cites a Senate Committee Report
which states that the language of Section 201 (a) of FLPMA
was specifically designed to bar suits similar to Parker.9
45. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 29 (1976).
46. See, e.g., id., 43 C.F.R. Part 4100 (1980).
47 Ray and Carver have suggested that the Section 603 "grandfather" clause
imposes a duty on the Secretary to issue mineral leases. See Ray & Carver,
Section 603 of FLPMA: An Analysis of the BLM's Wilderness Study
Provisions, 21 ARIZ. L. REv. 373, 385 (1979). This was almost surely not
the intent of Congress. Ray and Carver, incidentally, were the plaintiff's
attorneys in RMOGA v. Andrus.
48. RMOGA v. Andrus, supra note 1, at 1347.
49. Id. at 1342 (citing S. REP. No. 873, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1974)).
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Yet the court in Utah v. Andrus notes that the statement is
from a Senate Committee Report on a bill debated some two
years prior to the passage of FLPMA, and finds persuasive
the fact that the final statement of Senate intent contains
almost identical language, but includes no reference to the
Parker case, thus holding that Congress did not intend to
0
overrule Parker."
The Solicitor's interpretation finds additional support
in the legislative history. In the report accompanying House
Resolution 13777, which eventually became FLPMA, the
purpose of Section 311 (later Section 603) was described by
the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs as
follows:
While tracts are under review, they are to be managed in a manner to preserve their wilderness
character, subject to the continuation of existing
grazing and mineral uses and appropriation under
the mining laws. The Secretary will continue to
have authority to prevent unnecessary and undue
degradation of the lands ... "
It can be seen that the committee report made no mention of
mineral leasing in its statement of the purpose of Section
603, which would indicate that Congress did not intend that
oil and gas leasing be exempt from the non-impairment
standard.2
Finally, a report accompanying the Senate version of
FLPMA had this to say about the purpose behind Section
201 of FLPMA: 1
The Committee fully expects that the Secretary,
whenever possible, will make management decisions which will insure that no future use or combination of uses which might be discovered as appro50. Utah v. Andrus, supra note 24, at 1007 n. 16.
51. H.R. REP. No. 1163, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1976) (emphasis added).
52. The court in Utah v. Andrus found that the report persuasively indicated
that the Secretary's authority to prevent impairment of wilderness characteristics was meant to be a new addition to his continuing authority to
regulate all uses so as to prevent undue degradation. Utah v. Andrus,
supra note 24, at 1006.
53. Section 201 provides, in pertinent part: "The preparation and maintenance of such inventory or the identification of such areas shall not, of
itself, change or prevent change of the management or use of the public
lands." FLPMA § 201, 43 U.S.C. § 1711(a) (1976).
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priate in the inventory processes-be they wilderness, grazing, recreation, timbering, etc.,-will be
foreclosed by any use or combination of uses conducted after the enactment of S.507, but prior to
the completion of those processes."'
This passage is strong evidence that Congress intended that
the Secretary should use his discretionary authority to prevent impairment of wilderness characteristics during the
inventory process. It certainly does not indicate any intent
that oil and gas leasing should be exempt from the nonimpairment standard, particularly if the Secretary should
decide that a particular oil and55 gas project would impair
an area's wilderness suitability.
Because lands already declared wilderness are open to
mineral leasing until December 31, 1983,5" the RMOGA
court, citing its earlier decision in Mountain States Legal
Foundation v. Andrus, declined to "condone the anomalous
position" that FLPMA mandates imposing a stricter duty
on lessees in proposed wilderness areas than the Wilderness
Act imposes on land already declared wilderness." However, there is strong evidence that this was, in fact, the intent
of Congress. Section 603 states: "Once an area has been
designated for preservation as wilderness, the provisions of
the Wilderness Act ... shall apply. . . ."" This language
indicates that there are two separate managment standards;
one standard for lands under review as wilderness, and one
for lands already designated wilderness. If the provisions
of the Wilderness Act do not apply until an area has been
designated wilderness, there is necessarily another standard
for lands under review.
The Public Lands Law Review Commission, created by
Congress in 1964 to study the land laws and recommend a
more coherent course for the management of the public
lands, and from whose recommendations FLPMA eventually
materialized, also recognized the need to manage study areas
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

S. REP. No. 583, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1976).
See, e.g., Utah v. Andrus, supra note 24, at 1004.
16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) (3) (1976).
RMOGA v. Andrus, supra note 1, at 1346.
FLPMA § 603, 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1976) (emphasis added).
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so as to prevent foreclosure of Congressional discretion in
the designation of wilderness areas: "Because, in most cases,
the procedure involves statutory designations, withdrawals
for limited periods will be necessary to protect values while
awaiting formal designation." 5 If BLM were to allow new
actions which would impair the suitability of a particular
area for wilderness designation, the whole purpose of the
wilderness review would be defeated. Parker v. United
States held that allowing agency decisions to destroy wilderness values would violate the clear intent of Congress as
stated in Section 1132(b) of the Wilderness Act, that both
the President and Congress should have a meaningful opportunity to add areas to the wilderness system.6 The legislative history of FLPMA supports the same conclusion.2
D. The Taking Issue
The court in RMOGA v. Andrus held that BLM's policy
of subjecting oil and gas leases in proposed wilderness areas
to the restrictions of the non-impairment standard had the
effect of creating "shell" leases with no development rights.
Such a system, according to the court, "is clearly an unconstitutional taking and is blatantly unfair to lessees."63 To
arrive at this result, the court looked to Section 701(h) of
FLPMA, which states: "All actions by the Secretary under
this Act shall be subject to valid existing rights."6 4 The
court, however, failed to make a distinction between leases
issued before the passage of FLPMA and leases issued thereafter. This distinction is crucial to a determination of whether the lease carries an "existing" right, the deprivation of
which is an unconstitutional taking.
It is quite evident that the Secretary of the Interior
has no obligation to issue any lease on public lands. It is
also clear that the mere application for a lease vests no
59. PUBLIC LANDS LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

LAND 198-99 (1970).
See Utah v. Andrus, supra note 24, at 1007.
Parker v. United States, supra note 16, at 797.
See supra text accompanying note 54.
RMOGA v. Andrus, aupra note 1, at 1345.
FLPMA § 701(h), 43 U.S.C. § 1701(h) (1976).
Arnold v. Morton, 529 F.2d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 1976).
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rights in the applicant." If a lease is issued, the Secretary
has broad authority to promulgate reasonable regulations
regarding the federal lands involved." Furthermore, in order to gain a right conferred by the United States, a petitioner must accept those rights upon such terms as the Congress has determined should be imposed in the public interest. 8 Therefore, it follows that leases issued after the
passage of FLPMA, even if they were applied for before
passage of the Act, carry with them a duty to comply with
such regulations as the Secretary or Congress determines
are in the public interest. It would not be an unconstitutional taking for the Secretary to refuse to issue a lease, nor
would it be a taking if the Secretary chose to issue a lease
with stipulations which would cause additional expense to
the developer of the leasehold: "It is not a taking for the
Government to withhold a benefit it is not contractually or
constitutionally obliged to confer. Nor is it a taking for the
Government to impose financial obligations upon the recipient of a benefit if, as here, the benefit may be declined."6
In Union Oil of California v. Morton," the Ninth Circuit held that an oil and gas lease may be terminated by its
own terms, provided that stated conditions subsequent occur.7" This holding seems to run counter to the Wyoming
court's decision that application of the non-impairment standard to leases issued after the passage of FLPMA constitutes a taking. For example, should the Secretary issue a
lease subject to the possibility that the area may be declared
wilderness, the lessee must develop that lease according to
the non-impairment standard until a wilderness determination is made. Should the area be found unsuitable for wilderness designation, the lessee is free to develop that leasehold according to the undue degradation standard. On the
other hand, should the land be declared a wilderness area
66. Id. at 1106.
67. Topaz Beryllium Co. v. United States, 649 F.2d 775, 7'79 (10th Cir. 1981).
68. Portland General Electric Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 328 F.2d 165,
173 (9th Cir. 1964).
69. Id.
70. 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975).
71. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol17/iss2/6

16

Corbett: Public Lands - Oil and Gas Leasing in Proposed Wilderness Areas -

1982

CASE NOTES

503

after the deadline for mineral entry,72 his lease will be terminated by the occurrence of a condition subsequent, of which
he was well aware when he bargained for the lease. This
termination would therefore not be a taking.
As previously noted, the policy of the Department of the
Interior was to grandfather only those pre-FLPMA leases
upon which actual uses had created physical impacts on the
ground as of October 21, 1976. Post-FLPMA leases and preFLPMA leases upon which no activity had taken place as of
that date were subject to the stringent non-impairment standard.73 Because most oil and gas leases issued by the Department require the lessee to comply with regulations promulgated both before and after the issuance of the lease, it was
the position of the Interior that this limited the protection
given to "valid existing rights" by Section 701(h)." There
are, however, both interpretive and constitutional difficulties with this approach. 5 Like the Wyoming court, the Solicitor did not sufficiently consider the distinctions between
pre- and post-FLPMA leases, and to what extent each carried valid existing rights.
76
In Penn CentralTransportationCo. v. New York City,
the Supreme Court held that private property rights may be
impaired by the Government without becoming a taking that
requires compensation, if such impairment is for a substantial public purpose. However, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,7 the Court has also recognized that restrictions on
property rights, even if they further important public interests, may so frustrate "distinct investment-backed expectations" as to constitute a taking."'
72. The deadline at present is December 31, 1983. See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) (3)
(1976).
73. BLM Interim Management Policy, supra note 18, at 72,013.
74. Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 13, at 19.
75. In Union Oil of California,the Ninth Circuit also found that, although a
lease can be terminated by a condition subsequent, in that case a violation
of Interior Department regulations, those regulations must have been in
existence before the issuance of the lease. Union Oil of California v.
Morton, supra note 70, at 749. This would seem to undermine the Solicitor's argument that pre-FLPMA leases can be held subject to post-FLPMA
regulations. The lessee did not bargain for a lease with such regulations.
76. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See also Goldblatt v. Hempstead. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
77. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
78. Id. at 415; Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, supra note
76, at 127.
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The degree to which the Government, by exercise of its
regulatory power, may interfere with the enjoyment of private property rights without having to pay compensation is
a difficult question.79 There is a strong argument here that
application of the non-impairment standard (and possible
wihtdrawal of the area from mineral leasing) to a preFLPMA lease, as mandated by the Solicitor's Opinion, is
sufficient frustration of investment-backed expectations under the Pennsylvania Coal standard to constitute a Fifth
Amendment taking.8" The lessee, when he bargained for the
lease, had no idea that his lease might be regulated by a
standard which could preclude effective development.81
E. The Codiron Opinion
On October 5, 1981, the Solicitor for the Department of
the Interior under the Reagan Administration, William H.
Coldiron, issued an opinion addressing the relationship between the protection of valid existing rights under Section
701(h) and the wilderness review provisions of Section
603.8" This new opinion modifies the Solicitor's Opinion of
September 5, 1978. Although consistent with the result
reached by the court in RMOGA v. Andrus with regard to
pre-FLPMA leases, the Coldiron Opinion explicitly states
that it does not adopt that court's rationale for the decision,83
nor does it adopt the Wyoming court's result with regard to
post-FLPMA leases.
The Coldiron Opinion accepts the position of the previous Krulitz Opinion that Section 603 mandates two management standards--non-impairment and no undue degradation-but it goes on to find that the "savings" clause of
79. See, e.g., Union Oil of California v. Morton, supra note 70, at 750; Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, supra note 76, at 123.
80. This problem is addressed by the opinion of the present Solicitor. See
infra text accompanying notes 82-90.
81. However, this is only true if the land is finally declared a wilderness and
withdrawn from mineral entry, or if the lease expires because the lessee
cannot drill within the primary term of the lease because of the nonimpairment standard.
82. Memorandum from Solicitor to Secretary of Interior, The BLM Wilderness
Review and Valid Existing Rights (Oct. 5, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Coldiron Opinion].
83. Id. at 1 n. 1.
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Section 701 (h)s" is a limitation on the non-impairment standard of Section 603; the standard cannot be applied in a
manner that would prevent the exercise of any "valid existing right".8" The new Solicitor's opinion finds that "valid
existing rights" are those rights immune from denial or
extinguishment by the Secretary.86 Such valid rights can
be created by the Secretary, but once the Secretary has
granted a right, such as an oil and gas lease, the applicant
has valid existing rights in that lease. Activities on the
lease, therefore, are subject to the non-impairment standard
only to the extent that the standard does not unreasonably
interefere with the enjoyment of those rights. If non-impairment does interfere with the enjoyment of valid existing
rights, only the undue and unnecessary degradation management standard applies."' The Coldiron Opinion also
makes a careful distinction between pre- and post-FLPMA
leases; the opinion cites Utah v. Andrus for the proposition
that all leases issued after October 21, 1976, are subject to
non-impairment, because after that date the Secretary had
no authority to issue leases under any other management
standard.88
The major difference between the Krulitz and the Coldiron interpretations of FLPMA is that while the Krulitz
Opinion would grandfather only uses that were actually
initiated before the passage of FLPMA, and then regulate
those uses to the same manner and degree of activity as
existed on that date, the Coldiron Opinion would grandfather all leases issued before the passage of the Act, regardless of whether any activity had actually been initiated on
that date.
This new interpretation of BLM's regulatory authority
under FLPMA does not alter the substantive issues in the
appeal of RMOGA v. Andrus, but it does take a more reas84. The statutory language is as follows: "All action by the Secretary concerned under this Act shall be subject to valid existing rights." FLPMA
§ 701(h), 43 U.S.C. § 1701(h) (1976).
85. Coldiron Opinion, supra note 82, at 2.
86. Id. at 3.
87. Id. at 5.
88. Id. The Opinion does not adopt the Utah court's decision that only actual
uses are grandfathered.
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oned stand on the taking of private rights than does the
Wyoming court's opinion. The Coldiron Opinion directs the
Secretary to look to the specific pre-FLPMA lease document
to determine the full extent of the lessee's valid existing
rights; and although this gives the Secretary much more discretion to foreclose wilderness consideration of an area than
did the previous Solicitor's opinion, by allowing uses which
might impair wilderness suitability, it avoids the problem
of Departmental regulations being held an unconstitutional
taking. Because a lessee will not be deprived of rights for
which he bargained, and which he was granted in his lease
document, it cannot be said that Secretarial regulation
would deprive him of investment-backed expectations.
While the Coldiron Opinion does appear to solve the
taking problem implicit in the Krulitz Opinion, the language
of the "subject to" clause of Section 603 does not lend itself
any more readily to the Coldiron interpretation than it does
to the Wyoming court's interpretation of the section. 9 The
"manner and degree" language, in particular, is far more
easily read to support the position of the Krulitz Opinion 0
than either of the other two. Neverthless, the Coldiron interpretation balances the competing interests of wilderness
and development explicit in Section 603 of FLPMA more
equitably than the opinion of the court in RMOGA v. Andrus,
and is therefore the best available interpretation of the
statutory language.
CONCLUSION

The Federal Land Policy Management Act is a comprehensive and difficult piece of legislation which attempts to
balance all the many competing interests in the public lands.
The wilderness review provisions of Section 603 are a par-.
ticularly troublesome source of conflict reflecting, as they
do, the public demand for domestic energy development on
the one hand, and the preservation of wilderness on the other.
Despite the holding of the court in RMOGA v. Andrus that
the statute is clear on its face, Section 603 presents severe
89. See supra text accompanying notes 33-39*& 84.
90. See supra text accompanying note 12.
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interpretive difficulties, which will be resolved, if ever, as
much by prevailing social policy as by "correct" interpretation of the precise words of the statute."
Realizing that FLPMA reflects concern for competing
public policies and interests, the court states that one policy
should not suffer for the benefit of another, that compromises must be worked out. The court goes on to find that
BLM's interpretation of the statute leaves no room for compromise-that mineral development is totally sacrificed to
environmental concerns, and yet the court's opinion seems to
turn full circle from the Solicitor's opinion, sacrificing environmental concerns for mineral interests. This decision
reflects only one side of this complicated problem, and in
fact, Congressional intent and the public policy behind
FLPMA demand that the competing interests in conflict here
must be much more delicately balanced than the Wyoming
court was willing to do.
Despite many interpretive difficulties, Section 603
clearly mandates non-impairment of proposed wilderness
areas. The opening of all such areas to full oil and gas development is as contrary to Congressional intent as the complete closure of those areas to development. Furthermore,
the foreseeable result of this decision, should it be affirmed
by the court of appeals, is that by removing the traditional
regulatory discretion over oil and gas leasing from the Department of the Interior, the court's decision would in turn
remove from the President and Congress the discretion to
declare these areas wilderness. The Wyoming court's decision mandates that oil and gas development (although not
mining, timbering or grazing) continue without regard to
the non-impairment standard. Development under a lesser
standard would, by definition, destroy the wilderness character of these areas; they would be neither roadless nor untrammelled by man. The President would then be foreclosed
from declaring any such area wilderness. In fact, the dis91. To a certain extent, one might argue that the whole concept of "congressional intent" in Section 603 is a fiction. Congress, in its attempt to balance the competing interests in the public lands, left the language of the
statute deliberately ambiguous, so that future interpretation would be up
to the courts, which would apply contemporary standards of social policy.
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cretion to preserve wilderness would then rest in the hands
of the oil and gas interests; they would need only cut enough
roads through a proposed wilderness area to destroy its
statutorily defined wilderness characteristics to insure that
the areas could never be declared wilderness.
If FLPMA is viewed in the dynamic context suggested
by the court in Utah v. Andrus, we must look to the overall
use of the public lands to determine if Interior is complying
with the broad purposes of the Act. Inevitably, some wilderness must give way to developmental interests, but the opposite holds true as well. The opinion of the Wyoming District
Court leaves no room for these necessary compromises.
HAULTAIN E. CORBETT
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